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In recent years, expectations have risen for effective risk over-
sight, especially during the recent financial crisis, and most of 
those expectations have been placed explicitly on the shoul-
ders of boards of directors. Stock exchanges, regulators, legis-
lators, credit rating agencies, and industry associations have 
implemented changes designed to strengthen enterprise-wide 
risk oversight with an emphasis on enhancing the board’s role 
in risk governance (Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, 2010; National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners, 2013; New York 
Stock Exchange [NYSE], 2004; Securities and Exchange 
Commission [SEC], 2009; Standard & Poor’s [S&P], 2012). 
Most of these place the onus of responsibility for owning risk 
governance on the board.
In terms of risk governance, there are two overarching 
responsibilities being placed on boards of directors:
1. The board of directors should understand and approve 
management’s process for overseeing enterprise risks 
(i.e., the board assesses the enterprise risk manage-
ment [ERM] process).
2. The board of directors should evaluate the risks iden-
tified by management’s process for overseeing enter-
prise risks to govern the actions taken by management 
to create value (i.e., the board uses information from 
the ERM process).
Pressure to fulfill these responsibilities is causing many 
boards to place expectations on management to design and 
implement robust processes for identifying, assessing, man-
aging, and monitoring the most significant enterprise-wide 
risks. In fact, almost 70% of over 1,000 executives surveyed 
indicate that many board members are asking for greater risk 
oversight involvement by senior management. That percent-
age grows to 88% for public companies (Beasley, Branson, 
& Hancock, 2015).
Often the board works through its audit committee to over-
see management’s risk management processes, and that results 
in the audit committee turning to executives in key accounting 
and financial reporting roles, such as the chief financial officer 
(CFO) or chief audit executive, for initial risk management 
leadership. Accordingly, the accounting profession has been 
actively involved in developing ERM methods. Specifically, 
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Research Insights About Risk Governance: 
Implications From a Review of ERM 
Research
Therese R. Viscelli1, Mark S. Beasley2, and Dana R. Hermanson3
Abstract
In recent years, expectations for increased risk governance have been placed explicitly on boards of directors. In response, 
boards are being held responsible for not only understanding and approving management’s risk management processes, but 
they are also being held responsible for assessing the risks identified by those processes as part of overseeing management’s 
pursuit of value. These increasing responsibilities have led a number of organizations to adopt enterprise risk management 
(ERM) as a holistic approach to risk management that extends beyond traditional silo-based risk management techniques. 
As boards, often through their audit committee, consider management’s implementation of ERM as part of the board’s risk 
oversight, a number of questions emerge that can be informed by academic research related to ERM. This article summarizes 
findings from ERM research to provide insights related to the board’s risk governance responsibilities. We also identify a 
number of research questions that warrant further analysis by governance scholars. It is our hope that this article will spawn 
varying types of research about ERM and corporate governance.
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Commission (COSO; 2004) issued Enterprise Risk 
Management—Integrated Framework to provide directors 
and managers with a model of the ERM process.
In response to these emerging expectations, a number of 
organizations have adopted ERM to enhance the organiza-
tion’s enterprise-wide risk oversight. ERM is a way to coor-
dinate all the risk management activities so that management 
and the board have a top-down, enterprise-wide view of the 
most important risks to the enterprise (COSO, 2004).
One of the challenges for the board of directors in fulfilling 
its risk governance responsibilities is determining whether or 
not management’s ERM practices are designed and operating 
effectively. In most situations, the board of directors is heavily, 
if not solely, dependent on management’s description and self-
assessment of the effectiveness of their risk management pro-
cesses. Boards may be unsure as to whether the ERM processes 
implemented by management are appropriate and consistent 
with emerging best practices, and they may question whether 
those processes generate risk information that the board and 
management can use to design and implement strategies to pro-
tect and enhance stakeholder value. In summary, boards are in 
need of information to help them fulfill their risk governance 
oversight responsibilities.
To respond to this need, we examine the emerging body of 
ERM-related research to provide insights relevant to board of 
director risk governance responsibilities. While the overall vol-
ume and extent of ERM research is relatively small, we review 
the emerging academic literature on ERM by performing sev-
eral searches for articles that provide insights related to ques-
tions boards may have in regard to enterprise risk governance. 
Specifically, we summarize findings from ERM research that 
provides insights to the following questions related to the 
board’s two primary risk governance responsibilities:
1. Research insights to inform the board as it assumes 
responsibility for understanding and approving man-
agement’s risk management processes that address 
these questions:
a. What types of organizations adopt ERM as a 
risk management paradigm?
b. What techniques comprise an ERM process?
c. What is the role of internal audit (IA) in ERM?
2. Research insights to inform the board as it assumes 
responsibility for evaluating risk information gener-
ated by ERM processes as it governs management’s 
strategic actions to protect and enhance stakeholder 
value that address these questions:
a. How are organizations integrating ERM pro-
cesses with strategy?
b. How does ERM affect firm value and perfor-
mance?
c. How does organizational culture affect the value 
of ERM?
We believe the emerging stream of academic research 
about ERM provides insights to boards as they assume 
responsibilities for risk governance. To synthesize that 
research for boards and other governance players, we sum-
marize key insights by organizing our review of the key find-
ings along the above questions. One of our goals is to 
synthesize this research to inform boards as they assume 
greater risk oversight responsibilities.
Because research on ERM is still emerging, we also 
believe there is significant opportunity for future research to 
provide additional analysis of a number of issues related to 
enterprise-wide risk management. Building on a model simi-
lar to Bromiley, McShane, Nair, and Rustambekov (2015), 
who reviewed ERM literature to promote research by man-
agement scholars, we review ERM research to develop a 
number of ERM-related questions to be examined by gover-
nance scholars (including those in accounting, auditing, and 
finance), which is a second goal of this study.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. 
The next section summarizes our methodology for identi-
fying ERM-related research, and the following section 
summarizes key findings from articles that provide insights 
to inform the board as it assumes responsibility for under-
standing and approving management’s risk management 
processes. We also include calls for additional research to 
provide additional insights related to that responsibility. 
The subsequent section summarizes key findings from 
articles that provide insights to the board as it assumes 
responsibility for evaluating risk information generated by 
ERM processes as it governs management’s strategic 
actions to protect and enhance stakeholder value. That sec-
tion also includes identification of a number of additional 
research topics relevant to the board. Finally, we provide 
overall conclusions.
Methodology for Reviewing ERM 
Academic Literature
We conducted several searches for articles to include in this 
review, focusing mostly on topics related to ERM. Using the 
electronic databases EBSCO, ProQuest, Science Direct, and 
Google Scholar, we searched on “ERM,” “risk,” “enter-
prise,” and “COSO.” The search was limited primarily to 
articles published after 1999, as ERM emerged mostly in the 
2000s. While some articles from financial and insurance 
journals are included in this review, overall, we have 
excluded most highly technical, industry-specific research 
that does not directly address ERM. The references in each 
of the articles selected for review were examined to identify 
additional articles that may not have been found in the search 
of the electronic databases. The focus was on published aca-
demic journal articles, but selected working papers have 
been included as well. Thus, we summarize the key findings 
from ERM-related research papers to provide insights rele-
vant to the board’s two overarching risk governance respon-
sibilities (see Figure 1).
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Research Insights Related to Board’s 
Role in Assessing Management’s ERM 
Processes
As expectations for more effective board risk governance 
have emerged, boards are being held accountable for under-
standing and approving management’s processes for manag-
ing enterprise-wide risks. For example, the NYSE’s 
governance rules place explicit responsibilities on the audit 
committee of the board to “discuss management’s risk man-
agement and risk assessment processes,” and the SEC’s 
proxy disclosure rules implemented in 2010 require public 
companies to include disclosures about the board’s role in 
risk oversight in the annual proxy statement (NYSE, 2004; 
SEC, 2009).
As boards assume greater responsibility for governance of 
management’s risk oversight processes, they face a number 
of questions relevant to their obtaining an understanding of 
and approving management’s approach to enterprise-wide 
risk oversight:
a. What types of organizations adopt ERM as a risk man-
agement paradigm?
b. What techniques comprise an ERM process?
c. What is the role of IA in ERM?
We use these questions as a framework for organizing our 
understanding of insights from ERM-related research per-
formed to date, and we build upon that to generate a number 
of research topics that governance scholars may consider for 
future examination. See Table 1 for a summary of the 
insights.
Organizational Characteristics of ERM Adopters
In light of limitations associated with traditional risk man-
agement, a number of organizations have begun to adopt 
ERM. The goal of ERM is to manage risks at an enterprise 
level to ensure that entity-wide risks to the organization have 
been assessed, rather than just one aspect of risk to the orga-
nization. As boards of directors respond to the increasing 
expectations for more effective board risk governance, many 
are placing pressure on senior executives to implement ERM. 
However, in making that decision, boards may question 
whether the implementation of ERM in their organization 
makes sense.
Colquitt, Hoyt, and Lee (1999) conducted one of the first 
studies on risk management as it applied to risk financing 
strategies, describing it as Integrated Risk Management. The 
authors surveyed 379 firms and found that the role of risk 
manager was growing in scope to integrate across the organi-
zation, beyond traditional financial risk management. 
Industry and firm size also were associated with a more inte-
grated approach to risk management and affected the finan-
cial tools used to oversee risk.
Subsequent studies examine organizational factors and 
financial characteristics of entities that adopt ERM to under-
stand factors that affect the embrace of ERM as a risk man-
agement paradigm. However, as firms do not usually 
announce when they are embarking on an ERM implementa-
tion, it can be difficult for researchers to determine who has 
implemented ERM. Some researchers have used announce-
ments of appointments of individuals to serve as chief risk 
officer (CRO) or disclosures of ERM activities as proxies for 
ERM adoption, while others have surveyed companies to 
understand their stage of ERM adoption.
Using the announcement of a CRO as a signal of ERM 
implementation, Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003) found that 
firms announcing a CRO were among the largest in their 
industry and were primarily in the financial and energy 
industries. While they did not find significant differences in 
firms’ ownership (institutional vs. individual shareholders), 
the study did show a relationship between higher leverage 
and a greater likelihood to announce a CRO appointment.
Pagach and Warr (2011) also used the announcement of a 
CRO as a signal of ERM adoption to provide additional anal-
ysis of firmwide factors that might explain an entity’s ERM 
implementation. The study found that firms with higher lev-
els of leverage and larger size (assets) were more likely to 
announce the appointment of a CRO, consistent with 
Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003). In addition, they found that 
more volatile operating cash flows and greater stock volatil-
ity were positively associated with the announcement of a 
CRO. Contrary to findings of Liebenberg and Hoyt, who did 
Board’s Role in Assessing 
ERM
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Figure 1. Overview of analysis.
Note. ERM = enterprise risk management.
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not find a difference in ownership structure between ERM 
adopters and the control group, Pagach and Warr found that 
firms with a high percentage of shares owned by institutional 
investors were more likely to have announced a CRO 
appointment, consistent with institutions’ desire for greater 
risk control. In a subsample of firms where CEO compensa-
tion could be determined, Pagach and Warr found that firms 
where CEO compensation was sensitive to stock volatility 
were more likely to have a CRO.
In a study of U.S. insurers with ERM initiatives found 
using a word search, Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) found that 
firms that have ERM initiatives were larger in size (assets) 
and had more institutional ownership, consistent with Pagach 
and Warr (2011). They did not find any significant associa-
tion between the extent of leverage, stock return volatility, or 
opaqueness and the presence of ERM, as had been found in 
some previous studies. In another study of U.S. insurers, Lin, 
Wen, and Yu (2012) performed a similar word search and 
found that firms that had implemented ERM had more rein-
surance and had greater geographic diversification compared 
with firms that had not implemented ERM.
Lundqvist (2014a) examined the relationship between 
ERM and credit risk management for a sample of banking 
institutions. The author found that credit risk was reduced as 
the level of ERM quality increased. No significant relation-
ship was found between ERM quality and credit rating when 
controlling for governance characteristics such as board 
independence, large ownership by a group, and corporate 
governance measured by Thompson Reuters ASSET4 envi-
ronmental, social, and governance (ESG) content. The author 
explains this last finding by suggesting that the market per-
haps values the risk management function itself, while the 
credit rating agencies focus on risk governance aspects.
Other studies have used different proxies for ERM imple-
mentation. Beasley, Clune, and Hermanson (2005) explored 
organizational factors and their relationship to the stage of 
ERM implementation, based on surveys completed by internal 
auditors. Like other studies that focus on the association of 
firm characteristics and ERM implementation, they found 
firm size (revenues) was positively related to the stage of 
ERM. In addition, the study found firms that had a CRO, more 
independent directors, or explicit ERM calls from the CEO 
Table 1. Summary of Research Insights.
Board’s role in assessing ERM Board evaluation of risk information
Characteristics of ERM adopters Strategy and ERM
Certain firmwide characteristics, such as size and industry, 
and certain board and other governance characteristics 
may be important factors that explain the decision by an 
organization to adopt ERM; however, there are mixed 
results related to other organizational factors and financial 
characteristics of firms that may be associated with ERM 
implementations.
While ERM is envisioned to provide an organization the opportunity 
to manage risks to achieving its strategic objectives, the limited 
academic research suggests that the integration of ERM and strategy 
has not been fully achieved, and organizations are struggling to fully 
leverage the strategic benefits of ERM.
ERM implementation ERM and firm value and performance
Only a few studies specifically address the use of ERM 
frameworks, and they tend to focus on the COSO 
framework. Organizations might rely to some extent 
on those frameworks, but they are not likely to have 
implemented significant aspects of them. Articles that 
present specific case studies of firms adopting ERM show 
that ERM implementation varies widely across firms, even 
in the same industry. There is no one way to implement 
ERM, and organizations have approached the launch of 
ERM in a number of different ways. The limited access 
to data about specific techniques and internal processes 
used by organizations as they implement ERM has 
limited the ability to conduct academic research about 
the effectiveness of those processes. There is limited 
knowledge about specific factors that may affect the 
effectiveness of any number of ERM processes.
Better firm performance and increases in shareholder value are often 
used as arguments to embrace ERM. There is some research that 
contains evidence that ERM provides value, which is measured in 
different ways across those studies. While there is a general theme 
that ERM is associated with enhanced firm value, a number of those 
studies are limited to the insurance industry.
Culture and ERM
Organizational culture has a significant impact on the decision to 
implement ERM and on the effectiveness of that implementation. 
Without sufficient support of ERM by the CEO or board of 
directors, organizations may struggle in their efforts to find strategic 
value in their ERM processes. Research about the role of culture in 
the context of ERM is limited.
Internal audit and ERM
Internal auditors have facilitated a number of ERM 
implementations, and there are concerns about 
the potential compromising of IA’s objectivity and 
independence when IA assumes responsibility for ERM 
implementation.
Note. ERM = enterprise risk management; COSO = Committee of Sponsoring Organization; IA = internal audit.
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and CFO were more likely to be at a more advanced stage of 
ERM, suggesting that top management support for ERM is 
critical for ERM implementation. Firms that engaged a Big 
Four auditor were also found to be further along in ERM 
implementation than were firms using smaller auditing firms. 
Firms in the banking, education, and financial industries were 
at a more advanced stage of ERM implementation than other 
industries. Finally, the study found that U.S. firms were less 
advanced in ERM implementation stage than international 
firms.
Using a sample of 825 firms located in the Netherlands, 
Paape and Spekle (2012) used the stage of ERM implemen-
tation (based on an ordinal scale of 1 to 5 with 4 to 5 being 
adopters of ERM and 1 to 3 having traditional, silo 
approaches to risk) to examine firm characteristics of those 
with more advanced ERM. They found larger firms and 
firms in financial industries were further along in ERM 
stage, and stock ownership was not found to be significant, 
which is consistent with findings in Liebenberg and Hoyt 
(2003). Unlike some of the other studies focused on ERM 
implementation, they did not find a relationship between 
having a Big Four auditor and ERM development. The 
authors also found that publicly traded firms, firms with a 
CRO, and those with an audit committee were further along 
in ERM implementation.
Baxter, Bedard, Hoitash, and Yezegel (2013) used S&P 
ERM quality ratings for banking and insurance industry 
firms to investigate variations in firm characteristics in rela-
tion to ERM ratings. Their results showed that companies 
with higher ERM ratings were more complex, had greater 
financial resources, and had better corporate governance. 
They also found that higher risk firms had lower quality rat-
ings, which they attributed to resource constraints limiting 
the investment in ERM.
Lundqvist (2015) surveyed 145 firms on two major 
Nordic stock exchanges across multiple industries and found 
that firms implementing ERM are larger, in line with Beasley 
et al. (2005), Liebenberg and Hoyt (2003), and Pagach and 
Warr (2011). As with Paape and Spekle (2012), having a Big 
Four auditor did not affect risk governance, and firms in the 
financial industry were marginally more advanced in ERM, 
consistent with previous studies (Beasley et al., 2005; 
Liebenberg & Hoyt, 2003). In addition, the quality of the 
ERM governance and the following year’s extent of leverage 
were positively related, consistent with limiting the use of 
free cash available to well-monitored managers. Finally, 
unlike prior research, organizations with higher leverage 
were less likely to have embraced ERM.
With the passage of Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), 
external auditors and corporate boards were assigned spe-
cific responsibilities for risk assessments related to financial 
statements. Farrell (2003) and Roth (2006) argued that firms 
can leverage SOX Section 404’s requirement that manage-
ment and auditors attest to the state of internal control over 
financial reporting effectiveness to promote the evaluation of 
risk at an enterprise level. Arnold, Benford, Canada, Kuhn, 
and Sutton (2007) found in a study of four firms that all of 
the firms believed their ERM was made more effective by 
the effort to become SOX compliant, but it was an “unin-
tended” consequence of the 404 compliance effort.
Many companies have either board-level or management-
level committees that have responsibility for ERM imple-
mentation. Previous studies identified as a limitation the 
ability to identify these firms. Subramaniam, McManus, and 
Zhang (2009) used the presence of a Risk Management 
Committee (RMC), as disclosed in a firm’s annual report, to 
signal ERM implementation in 200 of the top 300 Australian 
Stock Exchange listed companies. Unlike some previous 
studies, they did not find a significant relation between ERM 
adoption and financial industry, board independence, or 
leverage. The authors did find that an independent board 
chair and larger boards were positively related to the pres-
ence of an RMC, as was organizational complexity as mea-
sured by the number of firm segments. Like Paape and 
Spekle (2012), having a Big Four auditor was not related to 
having an RMC.
Hines and Peters (2015) found that firms within the finan-
cial industry that formed an RMC had higher leverage (unlike 
Subramaniam et al., 2009); had a larger, more independent 
board; and were more likely to have a Big Four auditor. The 
authors also found that lower financial quality, international 
banking activity, and merger and acquisition activity where 
related to having an RMC.
Key implications for boards. Our analysis of ERM research to 
address our first question of interest (What types of organiza-
tions adopt ERM as a risk management paradigm?) reveals 
that that certain firmwide characteristics, such as size and 
industry, and certain governance characteristics may be 
important factors that explain the decision by an organization 
to adopt ERM. In particular, most studies find that larger 
firms and firms in certain regulated industries, particularly 
financial services and insurance, are associated with ERM 
adoptions. We also observe in some studies that certain gov-
ernance factors, such as the level of board engagement, inde-
pendence, and the presence of institutional investors, are also 
associated with ERM adoptions. Other factors, such as lever-
age, stock price or cash flow volatility, and the presence of a 
Big Four auditor are sometimes associated with a firm’s deci-
sion to implement ERM. We summarize these insights in 
Table 1.
Opportunities for future research. The mixed results suggest 
the need for additional studies of the relationship of organi-
zational factors and firm-level financial characteristics with 
ERM initiatives. There are a number of research questions 
related to firm- or industry-level characteristics that might 
affect a firm’s decision to implement ERM that warrant fur-
ther analysis. Column A of Appendix A includes a summary 
of these research questions.
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ERM Implementation Process
While boards of directors and senior executives may concep-
tually embrace ERM, they often face a number of questions 
related to how organizations are implementing ERM to 
ensure its effectiveness in risk oversight. Because ERM is a 
relatively recent business paradigm, organizational leaders, 
including the board, have been calling for insights to help 
them understand specific processes that are needed when 
implementing ERM. A number of practitioner articles have 
been published with insights and suggestions related to pro-
cesses important when implementing ERM. Some articles 
provide detailed steps, activities, and tools that should be 
used, while others describe individual firms that have imple-
mented ERM, but not necessarily how they did it.
A number of ERM frameworks have been developed over 
the last decade to assist organizations in their design and 
implementation of ERM (COSO, 2004; International 
Organization for Standardization [ISO], 2009). When a 
board and its senior management team decide to implement 
ERM, they may seek conceptual frameworks related to ERM 
to guide the design of their ERM processes. In doing so, they 
may question what frameworks exist and which framework(s) 
are embraced by other organizations. Although only a few 
studies specifically address the use of ERM frameworks, we 
examine that research to summarize insights related to ERM 
conceptual frameworks.
In light of the prominence of COSO as a thought leader in 
ERM, Hayne and Free (2014) sought to understand the rise 
of the COSO framework to its point of prominence in risk 
management. The authors describe the processes and mecha-
nisms used by COSO to create the COSO ERM framework 
and enable it to become so dominant. Through a series of 
interviews with key stakeholders in risk management and 
analysis of secondary documentation, the authors describe 
the creation of “hybrid” professional groups and the impact 
of these groups on the eventual adoption of the framework.
Tekathen and Dechow (2013) studied a German organiza-
tion while it implemented ERM by using semi-structured 
interviews to understand how the organization implemented 
ERM. Because the organization professed to having used the 
COSO ERM framework, the authors compared the insights 
from the interviews with the COSO ERM framework to 
determine a fit to the framework. The authors stated that the 
COSO framework was based on “radical assumptions,” and 
they asserted that the COSO framework implies that experts, 
expertise, and eventualities are aligned within an organiza-
tion. The authors did not find this alignment in practice and 
concluded that ERM is not effective in reducing uncertainty, 
but instead increases the organization’s interaction with 
uncertainty, unless processes are designed to support the 
alignment.
Paape and Spekle (2012) addressed the actual use of an 
ERM framework, in particular the COSO ERM framework, 
by 825 firms based in the Netherlands. The authors reported 
that 43% of the firms indicated they used the COSO 
framework, but the study only dichotomously captured the 
use of the framework (i.e., framework used or not used) and 
did not provide any detail as to how much or how the frame-
work was used.
Beyond studying the use of ERM frameworks, the ability 
to conduct rigorous academic research about ERM imple-
mentation processes has been significantly limited by the lack 
of publicly available data about specific internal tools and 
techniques used as part of the risk oversight process. To 
address this limitation, studies that have focused on specific 
techniques used by firms when implementing ERM typically 
have used a case study approach or surveys to examine inter-
nal activities that are associated with ERM implementations.
Articles that present specific case studies of firms adopt-
ing ERM show that ERM implementation varies widely 
across firms, even in the same industry.1 Arena, Arnaboldi, 
and Azzone (2010) studied three non-financial Italian firms 
over a 7-year period. All three firms professed to have an 
enterprise-wide risk management process, but each firm’s 
approach and resulting ERM process was influenced by the 
firm’s risk rationale. One firm’s rationale for ERM was for 
compliance, the second firm’s rationale was for stronger cor-
porate governance to provide external assurance, and the 
third firm’s rationale was to improve performance that would 
lead to enhanced company value. In another study, Arena, 
Arnaboldi, and Azzone (2011), again studied non-financial 
firms to understand the extent of ERM use and the relation-
ship of ERM use to the characteristics of the ERM tools 
implemented. The authors found that firms that used ERM 
for proactive actions, such as planning at the strategic level, 
had ERM tools that were highly integrated through the orga-
nization at all levels and risk was centrally managed. The 
study also found that the role played by the ERM coordinator 
must include interaction with managers at all levels to help 
those managers understand the value of ERM and to encour-
age open discussions across functional areas of the risks.
A working paper by Mikes and Kaplan (2014) used con-
tingency theory to identify design parameters that can explain 
variation in how three different case study organizations 
implemented ERM. Using interviews over the period of 
2008-2012, they studied the implementation of ERM in 
detail at the three organizations. They classify the implemen-
tation into three fundamental risk management components 
and then classify the types of risks each firm encountered 
into three categories.2 The authors found that organizations 
approached risk management in different ways, and the 
authors ultimately proposed that risk management is contin-
gent on the organization’s nature and ability to control differ-
ent types of risks, which supports the view that risk 
management is different for each firm.
In a single-organization study, Aabo, Fraser, and Simkins 
(2005) studied ERM implementation at a Canadian electric 
company. They chronicle the process beginning with the cre-
ation of a CRO position. The authors describe the actual pro-
cess including the techniques and tools that were used by the 
firm. The successful implementation of ERM integrated risk 
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into the workplace to the extent that the CRO position evolved 
into a low-maintenance position within the company.
Two articles examine the use of risk maps in the imple-
mentation of ERM. Woods (2009) performed a case study 
focused on a public sector entity’s risk management control 
system to examine whether risk management systems are 
similar across large organizations by comparing the risk pro-
cess with the Institute of Risk Management (IRM; 2002) 
model. Because the organization’s process was easily 
mapped to the IRM model, the author argued that large orga-
nizations’ overall risk processes are similar, as many organi-
zations are following the IRM model. Woods also described 
the use of heat maps (risk maps) to rank the organization’s 
risks on a scale from tolerable to material to severe (traffic 
light), which determines the level of control and monitoring 
(the resulting level of control and monitoring is the risk con-
trol system for the organization). The author concluded that 
the control system was affected by government policy, tech-
nology, and organization size.
Jordan, Jørgensen, and Mitterhofer (2013) examined the 
use of risk maps in the Norwegian petroleum industry as a 
way to represent risks within project management. They 
found that risk maps are being used to negotiate the boundar-
ies of different project areas. The appearance of a risk object 
on a risk map resulted in it being more likely to be discussed. 
The risk maps were used to mediate concerns between groups 
and resulted in topics not shown being avoided, thus setting 
boundaries on the meeting discussions. Overall, the risk 
maps were used to create project identity, increase commit-
ment to the project, and mediate between different groups in 
the company.
Studies that used surveys have each developed their own 
set of questions and surveyed a variety of groups, such as the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), 
The Conference Board, companies listed on the two Nordic 
stock exchanges, and firms based in the Netherlands. Paape 
and Spekle (2012) examined design choices of ERM by 
firms and the effects of the choices on risk management 
effectiveness. The authors found that the frequency of risk 
assessments and risk reporting and the use of quantitative 
approaches are associated with higher stages of ERM imple-
mentation. They also found that use of the COSO framework 
did not contribute to higher risk management effectiveness.
Another article based on the COSO ERM framework, 
Gates, Nicolas, and Walker (2012), surveyed Conference 
Board member firms to study the practical side of ERM.3 
Based on 150 completed responses, the authors modeled the 
direct impact that each of the components has on the subse-
quent component beginning with objective setting through 
performance. The study found that a structured approach to 
risk management can result in enhanced management and 
improved performance.
Beasley, Branson, and Pagach (2015) examined specific 
risk management processes associated with greater ERM 
maturity using a sample of 645 organizations across a number 
of industries. They found ERM maturity to be positively asso-
ciated with boards of directors that are more actively engaged 
in risk oversight. ERM maturity also was positively related to 
organizations with risk management responsibilities assigned 
to a board committee, formal risk management reports to the 
board, and a formally articulated risk appetite.
Lundqvist (2014b) used survey results from 153 firms on 
two Nordic stock exchanges to understand ERM implemen-
tation and found four ERM implementation factors: (1) gen-
eral internal environment and objective setting, (2) specific 
risk identification and risk assessment activities, (3) holistic 
organization of risk management, and (4) general control 
activities and information and communication. Lundqvist 
explained that Factors 1 and 4 could be viewed as “prerequi-
sites” of an ERM implementation because they are necessary 
to support ERM but can exist without any effort toward risk 
management. Factor 2 represents efforts by the organization 
to manage certain types of risks, such as financial and com-
pliance. Lundqvist identified Factor 3 as the true ERM iden-
tifier. Factor 3 represents organizational activities such as a 
formal, written risk appetite definition, senior management 
responsible for overseeing risk and risk management, and 
formal risk management reports provided to the board on a 
regular schedule. These activities are typical of firms 
approaching risk holistically the definition of ERM.
Ittner and Oyon’s (2014) data consisted of responses from 
the corporate-level finance and risk executives of 1,051 
international firms in multiple industries. The authors found 
that the breath of functional and hierarchical ownership of 
risk is positively associated with the sophistication of a 
firm’s ERM implementation and that management practices 
are more closely associated with the levels and functions of 
the risk owners, not the number of owners. When the CFO of 
a firm has risk ownership, significantly larger contributions 
are made to a wider range of strategic and operational risks.
Finally, Viscelli, Hermanson, and Beasley (2016) con-
ducted a series of semi-structured interviews with 15 ERM 
champions representing 14 organizations headquartered in 
the United States to gain insight into how firms actually 
implement ERM. They found that most firms began their 
process by developing a list of risks. Very few of the firms 
provided formal education on ERM to the employees 
involved in the ERM implementation. Most of the organiza-
tions did not define risk appetite. The most positive ERM 
impact on the firm was greater risk awareness, risk manage-
ment, and risk mitigation, and more timely dissemination of 
risk information was identified as the Number 1 change to 
the firm.
Key implications for boards. A key “takeaway” from our analy-
sis of ERM research to address our second question of inter-
est (What techniques comprise an ERM process?) is that 
there is no one specific approach used by organizations to 
implement ERM. While several organizations mentioned 
they have found some benefit in considering aspects of an 
ERM framework, such as COSO (2004), our review of the 
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research suggests that organizations approach the launch of 
ERM in a number of different ways, and they have not 
focused on implementing all elements laid out in an ERM 
framework. Some start by leveraging existing processes, 
while others start by appointing individuals to serve in new 
CRO roles or they create a RMC among the executive team 
to launch the process. But, one common aspect noted in sev-
eral studies is that most organizations engaged management 
in an initial risk identification task early in an ERM launch, 
and a number of those organizations used “heat maps (risk 
maps)” to summarize the most important risks identified.
Opportunities for future research. The limited access to data 
about specific techniques and internal processes used by 
organizations as they implement ERM has limited the ability 
to conduct academic research about the effectiveness of 
those processes. There is limited knowledge about specific 
factors that may affect the effectiveness of any number of 
ERM processes. Research that sheds insights into tools and 
techniques, including both their advantages and disadvan-
tages, would be extremely beneficial to better understand 
factors that strengthen an entity’s overall risk oversight. As 
researchers can gain access to data about specific ERM 
implementations, there are a number of important research 
questions specific to ERM implementation processes that 
warrant academic study by governance scholars. We sum-
marize a number of research questions related to ERM 
implementations in column B of Appendix A.
Internal Auditing and ERM
In response to growing expectations for more effective board 
risk governance, a number of boards have called upon IA to 
assist them with their ERM efforts. In many organizations, 
the audit committee of the board is responsible for oversight 
of the IA function, and there are direct lines of communica-
tion between IA and the board via the audit committee. 
Because IA has an enterprise-wide focus and because IA pro-
cedures are often risk-based, a number of boards of directors 
have initially assigned responsibility for ERM leadership to 
IA. However, in doing so, some boards may question what 
IA’s role in ERM should be, and they may have concerns 
about how ERM leadership affects IA’s objectivity.
The IA function, especially the chief audit executive, is 
frequently tasked with the leadership of ERM implementa-
tion (Viscelli et al., 2016). While there is disagreement in the 
IA community about how closely the Institute of Internal 
Auditors (IIA; 2004) guidelines about IA involvement in 
ERM should be followed, there is agreement that IA should 
never “own” risk, because owning the risk would jeopardize 
IA’s independence and objectivity in evaluating risk (Jackson, 
2005). Several articles discuss the appropriate role of the IA 
function in ERM.
The IIA released a position paper, The Role of Internal 
Auditing in Enterprise-Wide Risk Management (IIA, 2004), 
shortly after COSO (2004) released its ERM framework. The 
IIA provided guidance on the roles internal auditors should 
or should not perform in risk management, and it stated that 
IA’s core role is to “provide objective assurance to the board 
on the effectiveness of risk management” (p. 3). Some prac-
tice-based polls of IA practitioners provide some insights 
about consistency with the IIA guidelines. For example, 
Gramling and Myers (2006) found in a survey that the 
responsibilities held by internal auditors differed somewhat 
from The IIA’s guidelines, but that internal auditors under-
stood the guidance. Also, Sobel (2011) surveyed IIA mem-
bers through the IIA’s Global Audit Information (GAIN) 
Flash system and found that IA was not participating in core 
ERM roles, consistent with IIA guidelines on ERM imple-
mentation. In addition, Thompson (2013) provided a frame-
work that can be used to evaluate the potential conflicts that 
an internal auditor might face while implementing ERM.
Fraser and Henry (2007) found in a study of U.K. compa-
nies that internal auditors were playing a bigger role in ERM 
than recommended by the IIA, and there was concern that 
they were doing so at the risk of losing independence. 
Interviews revealed that internal auditors were in the role of 
risk management facilitators and consultants, rather than 
evaluators of risk management processes. This raised the 
question of whether the internal auditors were maintaining 
their independence.
Beasley, Clune, and Hermanson (2008) focused on the 
macro-level impact of ERM on IA. They surveyed 122 firms 
and found that, overall, ERM implementation positively 
affects IA by expanding IA’s work as the organization pro-
gressed through its implementation. This is not surprising, as 
ERM implementation requires significant resources, and, as 
outlined by The IIA’s guidelines, there are many roles for IA 
in the process. The authors also found a greater impact on IA 
by ERM when the CFO and audit committee have called for 
IA to have greater involvement in the ERM process and 
when IA has a greater role in leadership of the ERM imple-
mentation. This suggests that CFOs and audit committees 
may recommend that IA take a leadership role, thus leading 
to an impact on IA resources, which could lead to a loss of 
independence. The authors did not conclude whether greater 
IA involvement in ERM was helpful or harmful to IA’s inde-
pendence and objectivity.
Key implications for boards. Our analysis of ERM research to 
address our third question of interest (What is the role of IA 
in ERM?) indicates that IA has played an active role in the 
initial launch of ERM in a number of organizations. In some 
ways, this is not surprising given the board of directors often 
delegates day-to-day responsibility for the board’s risk over-
sight to the audit committee. Because the audit committee 
has direct oversight responsibility over IA, it is not surpris-
ing that boards, through their audit committees, have asked 
IA to assume some ERM leadership. However, that has led to 
concerns about continuing to use IA in an ERM leadership 
role. A number of studies have called attention to the impact 
of IA’s leadership of ERM on its ability to 
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objectively evaluate the functioning and effectiveness of the 
organization’s ERM processes. Boards may benefit from 
considering whether IA should continue in its ERM leader-
ship role.
Opportunities for future research. Because many ERM imple-
mentations have been facilitated by internal auditors, there 
are a number of research questions related to the impact of 
that reality. Although most IA functions use a risk-based 
approach to their audit scoping, it is uncertain the extent to 
which IA activities focus on risks beyond operations, finan-
cial reporting, and compliance into those risks related to 
strategy. In addition, while there are concerns about the 
potential compromising of IA objectivity and independence 
when IA assumes responsibility for ERM implementation, 
there is limited research as to whether that concern can be 
empirically supported. In response, we summarize, in col-
umn C of Appendix A, a number of future research questions 
that governance scholars could examine to provide addi-
tional insights about the role of IA in ERM.
Research Insights Related to Board’s Evaluation 
of Risk Information Generated by ERM Processes
In addition to responsibilities related to understanding and 
approving management’s approach to risk oversight, boards 
also are responsible for understanding risk information out-
put from the ERM process as part of the board’s oversight of 
management. Conceptually, ERM is a process designed to 
increase the likelihood that entity objectives are achieved 
(COSO, 2004). Thus, ultimately, ERM is designed to provide 
strategic value. But, as boards evaluate information gener-
ated by ERM processes in organizations they serve, they may 
have questions about how organizations integrate ERM with 
the strategy of the organization, and they may ask whether 
ERM processes actually enhance stakeholder value. We 
examine ERM-related research to summarize insights to 
these governance questions:
a. How are organizations integrating ERM processes 
with strategy?
b. How does ERM affect firm value and performance?
c. How does organizational culture affect the value of 
ERM?
We use these questions as a framework for organizing our 
understanding of insights from ERM-related research per-
formed to date and we build upon that to generate a number 
of future research topics that governance scholars may con-
sider for future examination.
ERM and Strategy
The COSO (2004) framework emphasizes that ERM is a pro-
cess “applied in strategy setting” designed “to provide rea-
sonable assurance regarding the achievement of entity 
objectives” (p. 2). That definition indicates that ERM is 
intended to focus on the management of risks affecting the 
strategy a firm uses to achieve its objectives. Similarly, Frigo 
and Anderson (2011) stated that ERM must take place within 
a strategic setting to actually create value.4 Despite these 
assertions, the academic literature indicates that firms typi-
cally are struggling to effectively link ERM to strategy.5
Beasley, Branson, and Pagach (2015) examined firm-spe-
cific factors associated with the perceived strategic value of 
ERM, using a sample of 645 organizations across a number 
of industries. They found that ERM is more likely to be 
viewed as a strategic tool when the organization has stated its 
risk appetite in the strategic planning process and when the 
board of directors receives, at least annually, a management 
report describing top risks. As for management-level pro-
cesses, they found greater linkage of ERM and strategy when 
the organization has a management-level risk committee, 
provides ERM training to executives, and regularly updates 
the key risk inventories. Interestingly, they also found that 
the presence of an explicit relationship between executive 
compensation and risk management increases the perceived 
strategic value of ERM. In addition, larger firms were more 
likely to view ERM as a strategic tool, while private firms 
were more likely than public firms to view ERM as value 
adding.
Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, and Wright (2014) interviewed 
CFOs, audit committee members, and audit partners within 
the same firms (which they referred to as the governance 
triad) for 11 organizations. They found that CFOs and audit 
committee members more often included strategic elements 
in their definition of ERM than did audit partners. In only 
two of the organizations did all three members of the gover-
nance triad mention strategy. Of the remaining organizations, 
half had triads where the majority of the triad members noted 
strategy in their responses, and in most of those triads, the 
audit committee member and the CFO were the ones noting 
the strategy connection most often. When asked about their 
individual role in addressing risks related to the four objec-
tives (strategic, operational, reporting, and compliance) out-
lined in the COSO (2004) ERM framework, the CFOs and 
the audit committee members were more likely to respond 
that they played a significant role in assessing risks related to 
the strategic objective. The external auditors saw their role as 
weak in the assessment of risks related to the strategic objec-
tive. The authors also reviewed the responses through the 
lens of agency theory and resource dependence theory. While 
they found that ERM was mostly playing a monitoring role 
(agency theory), they did see it being used to balance corpo-
rate strategy and business risks (resource dependence) in 
some cases.
Viscelli et al. (2016) interviewed ERM champions in 
14 organizations and found that most of the organizations 
adopted ERM due to a “strategic need to understand 
risk.” However, the most common area cited by inter-
viewees for future improvement in the ERM process was 
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the link to strategic planning, and making ERM more a 
part of the organization’s strategy was cited when asked 
about goals for the ERM implementation over the next 3 
to 5 years. Overall, the responses seem to indicate that 
ERM’s strategic impact is limited and that the ERM 
implementation process often begins with a resource 
dependence/strategic focus, but ultimately emerges as 
more of an agency theory/monitoring tool. As a result, the 
overall impact of ERM is limited by the failure to tightly 
link ERM and strategy.
In a study of 110 non-financial Canadian firms, Ben-
Amar, Boujenoui, and Zéghal (2014) found that a firm’s risk 
management approach is directed by the firm’s corporate 
strategy. Content analysis was performed on annual reports 
for 2007 to examine risk management. The authors reported 
that a firm’s business sector affects the risk exposure level, 
perception of risk consequences, and risk management strat-
egy for both individual risks and risk categories.
Key implications for boards. A key “takeaway” from our analy-
sis of ERM research to address our fourth question of interest 
(How are organizations integrating ERM processes with 
strategy?) is that while ERM is envisioned to provide an 
organization the opportunity to identify and manage risks 
most likely to affect the organization’s achievement of its 
strategic objectives, the integration of ERM and strategy has 
not been fully achieved, and organizations are struggling to 
fully leverage the strategic benefits of ERM. Organizations 
that have realized some strategic benefit are found to have 
boards of directors more engaged in the risk governance 
process.
Opportunities for future research. Future research is needed on 
the processes and activities used to incorporate ERM into 
strategic planning, the related keys to how organizations 
have successfully connected risk management and strategic 
planning, and the extent that ERM is considered a priority for 
running the business. We summarize in column A of Appen-
dix B a number of research questions related to the integra-
tion of ERM and strategy that can be examined by governance 
scholars to provide insight to boards to help them properly 
position risk governance for strategic value.
Firm Value and Performance
As noted in the COSO definition of ERM, the goal of an 
effective ERM process is to increase the likelihood that orga-
nizations achieve their objectives. Although that is conceptu-
ally appealing, a number of boards may question whether 
actual ERM implementations have demonstrated value-add-
ing contributions.6 To explore answers to that question, we 
examine prior ERM research for insights about the associa-
tion of ERM with firm value and performance.
Nocco and Stulz (2006) argued that the implementation of 
an integrated, holistic risk management environment (ERM) 
can be used to create value by better managing risk at a 
macro and micro level. By looking across the enterprise’s 
risks and coordinating them, ERM helps to ensure that no 
single project has a negative impact on the firm (Stulz, 1996). 
Unlike Nocco and Stulz (2006), Schiller and Prpich (2014) 
argued that ERM is lacking in solid empirical validation that 
the comprehensiveness is worth the effort, and its adoption is 
limited by its lack of solid theoretical support. The authors 
also point out that ERM does not provide institutional design 
recommendations.
While ERM has been widely accepted, there has been 
some resistance to the value proposition of ERM. For exam-
ple, Power (2009) argued that ERM encourages a “logic of 
auditability,” which results in process-based rules with an 
ever-expanding reach leading to “the risk management of 
everything” (Power, 2004). The author also argues that the 
narratives of risk management cannot articulate nor compre-
hend the interconnectedness of critical risks. Power (2009) 
suggested that business continuity management (BCM) is a 
better way to manage risk because it potentially has a better 
consideration of interconnectedness. Overall, Power (2009) 
suggested that ERM ultimately can lead to the “risk manage-
ment of nothing.” These views illustrate how some question 
whether ERM has the potential to be value adding.
Beasley, Pagach, and Warr (2008) used announcements of 
appointments of senior executives into ERM roles such as 
CRO to proxy for the launch of ERM. In a sample of 120 
announcements of a senior executive being appointed to an 
ERM role, they found that there are significant relations 
between the magnitude of abnormal returns for the 2-day 
period surrounding the announcement and certain firm-spe-
cific characteristics. The authors state,
For nonfinancial firms, announcement period returns are 
positively associated with firm size and the volatility of prior 
periods’ reported earnings and negatively associated with 
leverage and the extent of cash on hand relative to liabilities. For 
financial firms, however, there are fewer statistical associations 
between announcement returns and firm characteristics. 
(pp. 311-312)
Overall, the study found that the value of ERM is dependent 
on the overall risk profile of the firm, with shareholders of 
higher risk firms placing greater value on the announcements 
of CRO appointments relative to other firms.
Gordon, Loeb, and Tseng (2009) used a word search to iden-
tify 122 firms that disclosed ERM activities. Using Compustat 
data to measure strategy, operations, reporting, and compliance 
(the four objectives in COSO’s ERM Framework), they devel-
oped an index of the effectiveness of a firm’s ERM initiative. 
The ERM effectiveness measure was then used in a regression 
with independent variables representing firm characteristics.7 
The authors used a subsample of high performance firms, as 
measured by 1-year excess stock returns (2% or better), to 
establish coefficients (best practices) of the firm characteristics 
of high performing firms. The authors then developed an opti-
mum ERM score, which was compared with actual ERM 
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scores. They found that the smaller the difference in optimum 
score and actual score, the greater the expected performance. 
The results of the study indicated that firms whose ERM initia-
tive characteristics were properly aligned with the firm’s char-
acteristics should experience greater firm performance.
Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) performed a similar word 
search as Gordon et al. (2009) to identify insurance firms 
between 1998 and 2005 that had ERM initiatives. Using 
Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value, they found that firms 
with an ERM initiative had a higher median change in value 
than firms without an ERM initiative. On average, their 
results showed that firms with ERM initiatives were valued 
approximately 4% higher than firms without an ERM initia-
tive. However, unlike Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011), Lin et al. 
(2012) found that the market responded negatively to ERM 
adoption in a study of insurance firms using Tobin’s Q and a 
similar word search to identify ERM adoption.
McShane, Nair, and Rustambekov (2011) also used 
Tobin’s Q as a proxy for firm value and the S&P ERM rat-
ing. The authors found that insurance firms experienced an 
increase in firm value as the firms increased their risk man-
agement sophistication in traditional risk categories. As 
the firms moved beyond silo risk management to a coordi-
nated (holistic) approach, the firms did not see an increase 
in firm value. This suggests that firms achieve a higher 
level of performance as the firm improves overall risk 
management and controls, but further performance 
improvement is not apparent as firms move into more 
advanced ERM processes.
Gupta, Prakash, and Rangan (2012) examined 73 publicly 
traded firms, using a word search (1999-2009) to find the 
announcement of a CRO, and found that the market was 
more likely to react positively, as measured by increase in 
stock price, if the organization had few outside directors, 
suggesting that CRO appointments may lead to better 
governance.
Nair, Rustambekov, McShane, and Fainshmidt (2014) 
examined 60 insurance firms during the 2008 financial crisis 
to determine if the ERM processes align with the dynamic 
capabilities of the firm, allowing firms to better manage a 
changing environment. They calculated the stock decline 
between October 9, 2007 (S&P peak) and March 6, 2009 
(S&P lowest point). Profitability return was calculated from 
the lowest point and post-crisis high in April 2011. Using the 
S&P rating, translated to a scale of 1 (weak) to 5 (excellent), 
they found that a superior ERM rating (5) resulted in a 
smaller stock decline during the downturn and superior prof-
itability during the recovery period.8
Baxter et al. (2013) examined 165 insurance and banking 
firm-years that received ERM ratings from S&P from 2006 
to 2008 to investigate the rating in relation to firm perfor-
mance as measured by return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s 
Q. They found that firms with a higher ERM rating had 
higher operating performance (ROA) and higher Tobin’s Qs. 
The authors attributed this to ERM helping to mitigate risks 
and/or allowing the firms to take advantage of opportunities. 
The study also found that firms receiving a strong/excellent 
ERM rating initially had a stronger market reaction to the 
disclosure of the rating than those with lower ratings. In 
addition, they considered the time period before the global 
financial crisis, during the crisis, and after the crisis. They 
found a strong relationship between higher ERM ratings and 
market value only after the crisis and attributed this to inves-
tors looking for information such as the ERM rating to pro-
vide insight into a firm’s ability to address future risks.
In an additional study evaluating ERM maturity and firm 
value as measured by Tobin’s Q, Farrell and Gallagher 
(2015) used the Risk Management Society (RIMS) risk 
maturity model (RMM) to evaluate whether ERM maturity 
had an impact on firm value. Using the results collected from 
2006 to 2011, which resulted in 225 firms across various 
industries, the authors found that there is significant evi-
dence that ERM maturity has a positive impact on firm value. 
For firms with an overall RMM score of 3 to 5 (mature), firm 
value increased 25% and was highly significant as measured 
by Tobin’s Q. All of the areas of the RMM online tool were 
found to affect value, except risk appetite management and 
business resilience and sustainability.
In a study of U.S. insurers who answered the Tillinghast 
Powers Perrin ERM survey of 2004 and 2006, Grace, Leverty, 
Phillips, and Shimpi (2015) studied cash flow implications of 
the adoption of ERM and found that organizations having a 
cross-functional dedicated risk manager who reported to the 
board or CEO, along with a simple economic model, had sig-
nificant increases in revenue and cost efficiency.
Key implications for boards. Our analysis of ERM research to 
address our fifth question of interest (How does ERM affect 
firm value and performance?) reveals evidence that imple-
mentations of ERM do affect positively different measures 
of firm value. Some studies find stock market reactions to 
ERM implementation announcements, while others (but not 
all) find a relationship between ERM and firm value as mea-
sured by Tobin’s Q. Thus, there is empirical evidence that 
there is a connection between ERM and value creation.
Opportunities for future research. Because questions about the 
value relevance of ERM are often posed by boards of direc-
tors and senior executives who may be reluctant to embrace 
ERM as an effective risk oversight technique, further 
research is needed that might help to demonstrate whether, or 
when, ERM provides value to organizations. While there is 
some research that suggests ERM does provide measurable 
value, more research is needed to expand our understanding 
of the various dimensions of value for ERM. We summarize 
in column B of Appendix B a number of research questions 
that governance scholars could examine in future research.
Culture and ERM
Three of the major organizational change initiatives of recent 
decades, reengineering, total quality management (TQM), 
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and firm downsizing, have had less than stellar success 
(Cameron & Quinn, 2006). Lack of organizational culture fit 
to an initiative was given as a common reason for failure, 
leading to the belief that an organization’s culture and strat-
egy must be aligned to be successful. As ERM is a change 
initiative similar to the previously mentioned initiatives, it is 
reasonable to assume that an organization’s culture would be 
a significant factor in explaining the strategic value of ERM.
Mikes (2009) found in a longitudinal study of two banks that 
two cultures emerged, “ERM by the Numbers,” driven by a 
strong shareholder value imperative, and “Holistic ERM,” driven 
by a risk-based internal-control imperative. The ERM by the 
Numbers firm relied heavily on calculations for quantitative risks, 
which resulted in a diagnostic risk model. The Holistic ERM firm 
quantified risks but did not rely solely on the numbers. Also, 
senior risk managers with intimate knowledge of the business 
sectors responded to management’s concerns and thus influenced 
the actions beyond what the numbers might have shown.
In a follow-on study, Mikes (2011) interviewed 53 indi-
viduals in risk management positions at five major banks over 
the period of 2001-2010. The article sought to determine if the 
pursuit of expanding risk measurement in risk management 
was leading to a dysfunctional environment, as espoused by 
Power (2009) and Tabel (2007), and if the type of culture as 
defined in Mikes (2009) explained why some organizations 
become committed to risk measurements, whereas others do 
not. The author used boundary-work to suggest that organiza-
tions that are “ERM by the Numbers” create risk measure-
ments that imply the expertise on risk lies in the risk 
organizations and can lead to greater organizational control. 
Mikes described these organizations as having “quantitative 
enthusiasm” and being dedicated to risk measurements. 
Organizations that approach ERM in a holistic manner focus 
on combining risk measures with experience and intuition to 
develop soft measurements, which better reflect the risk of 
non-measurable strategic risks. The approach seems to leave 
the boundaries blurred as to where the expertise lies in an 
organization. These organizations were described as having 
“quantitative skepticism” and providing top management with 
alternative scenarios on emerging risks.
Cooper, Faseruk, and Khan (2013) performed a meta-
analysis of practitioner studies to determine the relationship 
between ERM and organizational culture. By grouping rele-
vant questions from 14 major risk studies published from 
2006 through 2010, the authors analyzed the responses from 
the perspective that organizational culture was a “major ben-
efit” or a “major barrier” to implementation of ERM. Their 
study did not put forth an answer to this question but did find 
that a significant number of entities consider organizational 
culture important to ERM implementation.
A common way of describing organizational culture is on 
a continuum from mechanistic to organic (Burns & Stalker, 
1961). Mechanistic cultures have a chain of command struc-
ture in the form of rankings of positions, vertical communi-
cation paths, and decisions driven down to employees from 
top management. On the other end of the continuum, organic 
cultures have a network of control and authority, lateral com-
munication paths, and employees who receive information 
and advice in a cooperative manner rather than instructions 
from supervisors.
Kimbrough and Componation (2009) used an instrument, 
Organizational Culture Assessment (OCA; Reigle, 2001, 
2003), which was based on the mechanistic/organic continuum 
of Burns and Stalker (1961), to study how the organizational 
culture framework is related to ERM implementation. In a 
study of 116 firms from 21 different industries, the authors 
found that organizations with higher organic scores were more 
likely to have a risk management program, were more likely to 
state that culture aided in the speed and effectiveness of ERM 
implementation, and were more satisfied overall with the effec-
tiveness of the firm’s ERM program. Firms with higher OCA 
scores (organic culture) were more likely to answer “yes” to the 
question of whether the firm’s culture has been modified to 
support ERM. This finding is not surprising given that organic 
firms are more open to change and innovation. The study did 
not find that culture was related to the presence of a CRO, but 
for the firms that did have a CRO, the firms with organic cul-
tures were more likely to have a formal risk management pro-
cess and to be further along in the ERM implementation. 
Similarly, Kleffner, Lee, and McGannon (2003) found that a 
hindrance to ERM adoption was a silo mentality at firms due to 
the firms’ organizational structure, which could be interpreted 
as a characteristic of a mechanistic culture.
Key implications for boards. A key “takeaway” from our analysis 
of ERM research to address our final question of interest (How 
does organizational culture affect the value of ERM?) is that 
organizational culture has a significant impact on the decision 
to implement ERM and on the effectiveness of that implemen-
tation. Some have argued that “culture is king” when it comes 
to ERM. Without sufficient support of ERM by the CEO or 
board of directors, organizations may struggle in their efforts to 
find strategic value in their ERM processes. Thus, boards may 
need to consider the organization’s culture as it evaluates the 
effectiveness of management’s risk management processes.
Opportunities for future research. Because research about the 
role of culture in the context of ERM is limited, additional 
studies are warranted to answer the question as to how orga-
nizational culture influences an ERM implementation. 
Research about elements of culture that affect the overall 
effectiveness of ERM is needed to help boards and senior 
executives in their efforts to implement risk oversight pro-
cesses that help them navigate risks that may be on the hori-
zon. We summarize in column C of Appendix B a number of 
potential research questions related to the role of culture in 
ERM that governance scholars may want to examine.
Conclusion
ERM is emerging corporate governance topic, particularly for 
boards of directors as they respond to increasing expectations 
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for more effective risk governance. ERM has become a major 
focus of many organizations because of legislation and regula-
tions, as well as recent corporate failures. While the academic 
research related to ERM is emerging, it is still in its early 
stages. Despite that, we believe that there are a number of key 
insights from research conducted to date that boards may ben-
efit from considering. We have highlighted a number of those 
in this article and in Table 1. We also believe that there are 
many other potential research questions that warrant rigorous 
academic study by governance scholars. In this article, we 
have identified a number of research questions in Appendices 
A and B related to the two primary ERM-related responsibili-
ties of the board of directors.
In some ways, the academic world’s embrace of ERM has 
lagged the business world. There is tremendous opportunity 
for researchers to contribute insights that would be highly 
relevant to business leaders, and this study attempts to pro-
vide motivation to encourage scholars to continue their 
examination of a number of issues that can inform key gov-
ernance players, including the board of directors and audit 
committee, in their risk governance efforts.
Research is needed along multiple dimensions of 
ERM, and expertise bridging a number of academic fields 
is needed. Because ERM is intended to oversee risks aris-
ing across the enterprise, academic experts in a variety of 
business disciplines (i.e., accounting, finance, informa-
tion technology [IT], marketing, strategy, and organiza-
tional behavior), in addition to experts in disciplines 
beyond business (i.e., economics, sociology, psychology, 
industrial engineering, computer science, statistics, and 
data analytics) have significant opportunities to contrib-
ute to our understanding of ERM. More importantly, 
research that integrates academic analysis of business 
and non-business disciplines can provide unique insights 
about what works well and what does not in managing the 
volume of complex risks facing enterprises. Because 
organizations will always face risks in the pursuit of 
value, organizations will constantly be seeking insights 
about more effective techniques to proactively manage 
the risks that may emerge. The academic community is 
uniquely positioned to assist with providing rigorous 
analyses that will provide insight into the effectiveness of 
ERM processes. The landscape of research questions 
related to ERM is open and diverse. The academic com-
munity needs to take advantage of this significant 
opportunity.
Appendix A
Summary of Research Opportunities to Address Board’s Understanding and Approval of ERM Processes.
Column A Column B Column C
Research opportunities to address, “What 
types of organizations implement ERM?”
Research opportunities to address, “What techniques comprise an ERM 
process?”
Research opportunities to address, “What is the 
role of IA in ERM?”
 1.  To what extent do prior risk events 
affecting the firm affect the decision to 
adopt ERM?
 2.  How are regulators affecting an entity’s 
decision to implement ERM, and 
how might regulations explain ERM 
adoptions in different industries?
 3.  What role does the board of directors 
play in encouraging ERM adoption?
 4.  How do differences in ownership 
structures, including shares held by 
directors, senior management, and 
institutional investors, affect ERM 
adoption?
 5.  How does the embrace of ERM by 
competitors explain a firm’s adoption 
of ERM?
 6.  To what extent does the life cycle of 
an industry or firm explain the need 
for ERM?
 7.  How does the level of diversification of 
an entity affect its decision to embrace 
ERM?
 8.  What additional measures are available 
to proxy for ERM implementation?
 9.  How does executive compensation 
affect a firm’s decision to embrace ERM?
10.  To what extent are ERM 
implementations affected by the types of 
executives responsible for leading risk 
oversight in the organization?
 1.  What attributes affect the embrace of a particular ERM 
conceptual framework, and why are frameworks important to 
ERM champions in an organization?
 2.  How might existing theories in the academic literature be used 
to strengthen ERM frameworks, and how might ERM frameworks 
be used to inform the development of new theoretical arguments 
for ERM?
 3.  How do organizations organize ERM processes across complex, 
global enterprises?
 4.  How are organizations aggregating risks to create an enterprise-
wide portfolio of risks?
 5.  What techniques are organizations using to help leaders of 
specific business functions recognize how their efforts to reduce 
risks in their function actually may create risks for other functions 
in the enterprise?
 6.  What techniques are entities using to engage executives in 
processes to prioritize risks?
 7.  What processes are organizations using to assess the existence 
and adequacy of responses to top risks to the organization?
 8.  How are organizations assigning ownership to executives for each 
of the top risk exposures identified by the ERM process?
 9.  How might executive compensation create incentives for 
excessive risk taking that is beyond the entity’s appetite for risk?
10.  How are organizations considering interrelationships (i.e., 
correlations) among individual top-tier risks identified by the ERM 
process?
11.  How are organizations developing KRIs to monitor changing risk 
conditions?
12.  How are organizations communicating top risks to the board of 
directors?
 1.  What are the typical ERM processes 
performed by IA, and what tasks are they 
not performing?
 2.  How do varying levels of involvement by IA 
in ERM processes affect perceptions of IA’s 
objectivity and independence?
 3.  What techniques are boards of directors 
and audit committees using to monitor 
whether IA is compromising its objectivity 
by performing ERM functions?
 4.  How do perceptions of ERM’s value 
differ when ERM is led by IA vs. by other 
executives in the firm?
 5.  To what extent are IA functions being asked 
to perform objective assessments of the 
organization’s ERM processes?
 6.  How is the output of ERM affecting the 
nature and extent of IA’s audit work for the 
enterprise?
 7.  Because ERM is focused heavily on emerging 
risks related to strategy, to what extent is IA 
able to respond to strategic risks?
 8.  To what extent are IA functions adjusting 
their staffing to include individuals with 
experience beyond traditional IA roles that 
focus on financial reporting or operational 
and compliance issues?
 9.  How are the results of IA involvement in 
ERM processes affecting external auditor 
assessments of and reliance on IA in financial 
statement and internal control audits?
Note. ERM = enterprise risk management; KRI = key risk indicator; IA = internal audit.
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Notes
1. For example, Acharyya and Johnson (2006) interviewed four 
insurance companies and found the answers so diverse that 
they concluded the implementation of enterprise risk manage-
ment (ERM) varies widely.
2. The components were (a) processes for identifying, assessing, 
and prioritizing risks; (b) frequency of risk meetings; and (c) 
risk tools. The types of risk were (a) preventable, (b) strategy 
execution, and (c) external (as proposed by Kaplan & Mikes, 
2012).
3. The survey questions measured eight components: (a) objec-
tive setting, (b) risk identification, (c) risk reaction, (d) 
oversight, (e) information and communication, (f) internal 
environment, (g) management, and (h) performance.
4. Funston (2004) found that of the 100 companies with the big-
gest stock-price loss during 1995 to 2004, 66 experienced stra-
tegic risks and 80% of the largest loss firms experienced two 
or more interrelated risks. Slywotzky and Drzik (2005) argued 
that companies are becoming better at managing overall cor-
porate risks but have yet to address the management of strate-
gic risks.
5. Gates (2006), in a survey of 271 The Conference Board mem-
bers, found that 66% of the firms were implementing ERM to 
foster a greater understanding of strategic risks but were more 
willing to accept strategic risks over more traditional risks, 
such as legal or financial risks.
6. Kraus and Lehner (2012) reviewed the ERM literature on value 
creation. They found that there is a lack of reliable proxies for 
Appendix B
Summary of Research Opportunities Related to Board Evaluation of ERM Output for Strategic Advantage.
Column A Column B Column C
Research opportunities to address, “How are 
organizations integrating ERM processes with strategy?”
Research opportunities to address, “How does ERM affect 
firm value and performance?”
Research opportunities to address, “How does 
organizational culture affect ERM?”
 1.  How are organizations embedding explicit, 
structured risk management processes into the 
strategic planning processes?
 2.  To what extent are organizations factoring in 
risk dimensions when allocating capital to specific 
strategic initiatives?
 3.  To what extent are entities using quantitative 
techniques, such as VAR, earnings at risk, and 
cash flow at risk, to assess ranges of potential risk 
outcomes?
 4.  How are organizations taking output from an 
entity’s ERM process as input to the next round of 
strategic planning?
 5.  If the organization is mostly focused on short-
term risks and strategies, how is the organization 
monitoring risks that may be emerging in the long 
term that might undermine the organization’s core 
business model?
 6.  What techniques are organizations using to assess 
and incorporate macroeconomic and geopolitical 
risk conditions into their strategic planning process?
 7.  To what extent are organizations aligning executive 
leadership of their ERM processes with executive 
leadership of their strategic planning processes?
 8.  How are organizations developing and communicating 
the organization’s appetite for risk taking?
 9.  How are organizations creating risk limits to 
ensure that management is not exposing the entity 
to risks beyond acceptable levels in the pursuit of 
strategic objectives?
10.  What techniques are boards of directors using to 
monitor whether management is taking excessive 
risks in the pursuit of strategic objectives?
 1.  What firm characteristics and conditions are 
associated with increases in firm value when entities 
engage in ERM?
 2.  What types of ERM implementation techniques lead 
to greater value enhancements?
 3.  To what extent does the value of ERM differ across 
different industries and firm life cycles?
 4.  To what extent do findings about the value of 
ERM differ across different measures of value (i.e., 
cumulative abnormal returns, Tobin’s Q, etc.)?
 5.  How is the value of ERM perceived differently 
by different stakeholders (e.g., bondholders, 
stockholders, regulators)?
 6.  What types of non-quantitative measures (i.e., 
qualitative perceptions of senior management, boards 
of directors, regulators) capture the value of ERM, 
and do those measures suggest value even if more 
traditional quantitative measures (i.e., cumulative 
abnormal returns, Tobin’s Q, etc.) do not?
 7.  What techniques are being used by organizations to 
demonstrate the value of ERM?
 8.  How might assessments of ERM at counterparties 
(e.g., suppliers, customers, joint venture partners) 
provide value in key business decision making?
 9.  To what extent do the characteristics, position, 
and experience of the individual who serves as the 
internal risk champion (i.e., a Chief Risk Officer) affect 
perceptions of value of ERM for the organization?
10.  How does the level of ERM embrace and 
engagement by the board of directors and the CEO 
affect the overall value proposition of ERM?
11.  How does the effect of a prior material risk event 
affect the perceived value of ERM?
1.  How is risk culture defined, and what are 
the key elements of risk culture that lead to 
more effective ERM?
2.  What types of organizational cultures are 
associated with more effective and value-
adding ERM processes?
3.  How does the manner in which the board 
of directors structures its risk oversight 
responsibilities affect the attitude and tone 
at the top regarding ERM?
4.  How do the title and position of the ERM 
leader affect the culture and embrace of 
ERM?
5.  What actions by the CEO help to support 
a strong risk oversight culture vs. a weak 
culture?
6.  How does the overall risk culture affect the 
value perceptions of ERM or the integration 
of ERM with strategy?
7.  How does risk culture change over time 
as the organization experiences different 
events?
8.  What are the typical cultural barriers that 
limit the embrace and development of ERM 
within an organization?
Note. ERM = enterprise risk management; VAR = value at risk.
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value and an inability to determine what part of ERM influ-
ences value.
7. The independent variables used were environmental uncer-
tainty (earnings volatility), industry competition (highly com-
petitive), firm size (total assets), firm complexity (diversity of 
business transactions), and monitoring by the board (size of 
board divided by the log of sales).
8. Aebi, Sabato, and Schmid (2012) found that banks with a chief 
risk officer (CRO) who reported to board instead of the CEO 
exhibited higher stock returns and return on equity (ROE) 
during the 2007/2008 financial crisis than firms whose CRO 
reported the CEO. Eckles, Hoyt, and Miller (2014) found that 
insurance companies that adopted ERM experienced a reduc-
tion in stock volatility that gradually grew over time.
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